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FORTIFYING THE RIGHTS OF UNAUTHORIZED
IMMIGRANT WORKERS: WHY EMPLOYEE
INCENTIVES UNDER THE NLRA WOULD HELP END
THE CYCLE OF LABOR RIGHTS ABUSE
Caitlin E. Delaney
Over the past several decades, there has been an unmistakable
tension between labor law and immigration law in the United
States. That tension, addressed by the Supreme Court most
recently in 2001, still exists for unauthorized immigrant workers
who wish to assert their labor rights under the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA). While the Obama Administration has made
significant strides in easing the concerns that unauthorized
immigrant workers may have before filing an NLRA claim, the
unavailability of the back pay remedy and the uncertainty of
protection from immigration authorities leave little incentive for
such workers to assert their labor rights. The federal government
has every reason to incentivize workers to stand up against
employers violating the NLRA, regardless of their immigration
status, because it ensures a fair and safe workplace for all. This
Note advocates for the federal government to (1) allow
unauthorized immigrants to recover back pay under the NLRA, and
(2) create a deferred action application process for those
unauthorized immigrants who bring claims under the NLRA. Such
action would deter employers from violating employees’ rights,
uphold the humanitarian values behind both labor and
immigration policy, and reward unauthorized immigrants who
unselfishly assert claims for the benefit of other workers.
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INTRODUCTION
On November 15, 2012, Griselda Barrera went to work at the
same job that she had held for the previous eight years.1 She was
employed by a staffing agency in Illinois called Staffing Network
Holdings, LLC, which provides “pickers” and “stockers” for a
company called ReaderLink.2 Ms. Barrera was a “picker,” which
entailed standing and placing books into boxes and sending them
down a production line alongside other employees performing the
same task.3 Ms. Barrera consistently met her employer’s physically
demanding standards and her work record was clean of any
disciplinary complaints for insubordination or work performance
issues.4 On November 15th, however, she witnessed her hesitant
coworker, Juan, speak out after his supervisor demanded that he
work at a quicker pace.5 After refusing to work faster at the rate he
was being paid, Juan was sent home and subsequently terminated
from his position due to his “attitude.”6 Ms. Barrera and other
pickers tried to defend Juan against their supervisor, explaining
that he could not keep up with the pace of the pickers because he
was new.7 Their supervisor ordered them to return to work and
warned that he could dismiss them for their “attitude[s]” as well.8
Later, the same supervisor threatened to dismiss Ms. Barrera
individually.9 When Ms. Barrera asserted that “she could send a
letter to the Department of Human Rights,” he responded by
sending her home.10 Ms. Barrera refused, stating that “she had
done nothing wrong.”11 Her supervisor then ordered another
1

Staffing Network Holdings, LLC, 13-CA-105031 (N.L.R.B. July 17,
2014), 2014 WL 3548163, modified, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 12 (Feb. 4, 2015), 2015
WL 471428.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
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supervising employee to send Ms. Barrera home for the day.12 The
company later advised Ms. Barrera not to return to work and
subsequently terminated her.13
Ms. Barrera filed a complaint with the National Labor
Relations Board (“NLRB” or the “Board”), which determined that
her employer had violated the National Labor Relations Act
(“NLRA”) by terminating Ms. Barrera in retaliation for her
“engaging in protected concerted activity.”14 At the time of
adjudication, Ms. Barrera’s employer raised the affirmative
defense that she was an unauthorized immigrant who was not
entitled to certain remedies under the NLRA.15 The administrative
law judge, however, asserted that the employer could not raise
such a defense until the compliance stage of the proceeding.16
Ms. Barrera’s story is important for two reasons. First, it
perfectly exemplifies the kind of employee conduct that the NLRA
was designed to protect.17 Ms. Barrera not only stood up for her
own labor rights, but also stood in solidarity with her fellow
workers. Second, it highlights the uncertainty of bringing a case
before the NLRB that questions an individual’s immigration status.
This uncertainty has persisted in the United States for over a
decade since the Supreme Court ruled in Hoffman Plastic
Compounds v. NLRB that unauthorized immigrants are not entitled
to back pay under the NLRA.18 This decision, though consistently

12

Id.
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
See National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–
169 (2012) (“It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to
eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of
commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have
occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective
bargaining . . . .”); see also Resources: National Labor Relations Act, NLRB,
http://www.nlrb.gov/resources/national-labor-relations-act (last visited Oct. 5,
2015) (noting that the NLRA was enacted “to protect the rights of employees
and employers” and “to encourage collective bargaining”).
18
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 151 (2002).
13
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criticized as impractical, illogical, and inhumane,19 continues to
dictate the remedies available to unauthorized immigrants who
choose to assert their labor rights under the NLRA.20
In the ten years since Hoffman Plastic Compounds,21 the
government has failed to implement a rule that harmonizes the
goals of the Immigration Reform Control Act (“IRCA”) and the
NLRA without denying unauthorized immigrants their basic labor
rights. The Second Circuit’s decision in Palma v. NLRB,22
subsequent federal district court decisions,23 and the 2013 Senate’s
proposed immigration reform initiative24 demonstrate the
inconsistency of remedial options available to unauthorized
immigrants and the continued need for reform. Incentivizing
unauthorized immigrants to bring meritorious complaints to the
NLRB is necessary to (1) deter employer-violators from violating
federal labor laws, (2) provide all workers full protection from
human rights abuse, and (3) reward unauthorized workers for their
citizen-like qualities and demonstrated commitment to fairness and
justice for all in the American labor force. In order to achieve an
employee-incentive based solution, the legislative and executive
branches should act in concert to reinstate back pay as an available
remedy to all workers regardless of immigration status and to
19

See, e.g., Ruben J. Garcia, Ghost Workers in an Interconnected World:
Going Beyond the Dichotomies of Domestic Immigration and Labor Laws, 36 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 737, 739 (2003) (“In deciding Hoffman, the Court had an
opportunity to reconcile immigration and labor law in a way that would benefit
all workers, but it instead highlighted the ineffectiveness of immigration law,
and labor law’s inability to protect all workers.”).
20
See, e.g., Palma v. NLRB, 723 F.3d 176, 187 (2d Cir. 2013).
21
See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 137.
22
Palma, 723 F.3d at 187 (holding that undocumented aliens who were
terminated in violation of the NLRA were not entitled to back pay).
23
See, e.g., Colon v. Major Perry St. Corp., 987 F. Supp. 2d 451, 453
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that undocumented workers are eligible to recover
unpaid wages); Akin v. Anjon of Greenlawn, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 3d 239, 242
(E.D.N.Y. 2014) (finding that undocumented aliens not being entitled to
backpay “does not preclude [them] from seeking a claim for unpaid wages”).
24
Border Security, Economic Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization
Act, S. 744, 113th Cong., § 3101(a) (2013) (proposing to amend “section
274A(a)(8)” of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a, to
include certain remedial options for undocumented workers).
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create an affirmative deferred action process for unauthorized
workers who come forward with complaints under the NLRA.
Part I of this Note provides background information as to the
status of unauthorized immigrants today. Subpart A provides
statistical information about unauthorized immigrants in the
American workforce. Subparts B and C explain the history and
relevant provisions of the two federal statutes that are at the heart
of this issue—the National Labor Relations Act and the
Immigration Reform and Control Act. Subpart D explores Hoffman
Plastic Compounds and its progeny. Subpart E outlines the current
administrative process for unauthorized immigrants, and Subpart F
discusses the recent immigration reform efforts of the legislative
and executive branches. Part II argues for an employee-incentive
based solution in order to deter employers from violating the
NLRA, to ensure equal protection of human rights to all workers,
and to uphold the American values that drive the NLRA and
current immigration policy. Part III proposes a two-pronged
solution which focuses on congressional and executive action.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Unauthorized Immigrants in the U.S. Workforce
The United States houses approximately 11.4 million
unauthorized immigrants.25 An estimated 8.1 million of those
immigrants are employed, representing approximately 5% of the
U.S. labor force.26 Unauthorized workers, along with other lowwage earning immigrants, most often work in industries known for
unfair and illegal working conditions.27 In New York City,
25

BRYAN BAKER & NANCY RYTINA, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STAT.,
ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE
UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2012, at 2 (2013), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/
files/publications/ois_ill_pe_2012_2.pdf.
26
JEFFREY S. PASSEL & D’VERA COHN, PEW RESEARCH CTR.,
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT TOTALS RISE IN 7 STATES, FALL IN 14, at 16 (Nov.
18, 2014) http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/2014/11/2014-11-18_unauthorizedimmigration.pdf.
27
DORIS MEISSNER, ET AL., MIGRATION POL’Y INST., IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 84 (Jan. 2013), http://www.migration
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immigrants represent the largest group of workers in industries that
are consistently unchecked by federal and state labor standards.28
Although federal labor laws purport to protect unauthorized
immigrants from substandard working conditions,29 several
obstacles stand in the way of meaningful legal protection.
The most obvious obstacle is the fear of interference from
immigration authorities.30 Unauthorized immigrants often do not
assert their labor rights for fear of deportation of their friends,
family, or themselves.31 Some critics believe that immigration
authorities should interfere, and that unauthorized immigrants
should not be afforded the same labor rights as U.S. citizens or
authorized immigrants32 because legal protection may further
incentivize illegal entry into the United States for unauthorized
work.33 This position often includes the misinformed argument that
unauthorized immigrants steal jobs from American citizens.34
Many lawmakers have recognized, however, that employment and

policy.org/research/immigration-enforcement-united-states-rise-formidablemachinery.
28
See ANNETTE BERNHARDT ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST.,
UNREGULATED WORK IN THE GLOBAL CITY: EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW
VIOLATIONS IN NEW YORK CITY 23 (2007), http://www.brennancenter.org/
sites/default/files/legacy/d/download_file_49436.pdf. In New York, these
“unregulated” industries include groceries, retail, restaurants, building
maintenance, and security, inter alia. See id. at 20–21.
29
See, e.g., National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§
151–169 (2012); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219
(2012).
30
See Daniel Ford et al., Protecting the Employment Rights and Remedies
of Washington’s Immigrant Workers, 48 GONZ. L. REV. 539, 542–43 (2013).
31
Id. at 542.
32
For the purpose of this Note, “authorized immigrants” refers to
foreigners working with valid employment authorization from the U.S.
government.
33
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 150 (2002)
(explaining that awarding backpay to unauthorized immigrants “condones and
encourages future violations” of immigration laws).
34
See Alvaro Vargas Llosa, Addressing and Discrediting 7 Major Myths
About
Immigration,
FORBES
(May
29,
2013,
8:00
AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/05/29/addressing-and-discrediting-7major-myths-about-immigration/.
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economic opportunities, rather than labor right protections, serve
as the “magnets” that draw people to the United States.35
B. The National Labor Relations Act36
In 1935, Congress established the NLRA under the Wagner
Act,37 aiming to “protect the rights of employees and employers, to
encourage collective bargaining, and to curtail certain private
sector labor and management practices.”38 The text of the NLRA
has not undergone any substantial changes since 1935, except for
the minor amendments established by the Taft-Hartley Act of
194739 and the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959.40 Section 7 of the
Act outlines the rights of workers to self-organize, to form or join a
union, to collectively bargain over the terms of their employment
through representatives of their choosing, and to engage in other
concerted activities for the purposes of collective bargaining or
mutual protection.41 Violations of the NLRA may manifest when
an employer retaliates against an employee who has complained
about unfair labor practices, advocated for better working
conditions, or attempted to form or join a union.42 Such retaliation
often takes the form of termination, threats of termination, pay
cuts, and threats to call immigration enforcement agencies.43

35

See H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. 1, at 46 (1986), as reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649.
36
National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–169
(2012).
37
The 1935 Passage of the Wagner Act, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/whowe-are/our-history/1935-passage-wagner-act (last visited Oct. 5, 2015).
38
Resources: National Labor Relations Act, supra note 17.
39
Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, Pub. L. 80101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29
U.S.C.).
40
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of
1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 29 U.S.C.).
41
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
42
BERNHARDT, supra note 28, at 11.
43
Id.
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The NLRA established the NLRB, a quasi-judicial body, to
enforce its provisions.44 The NLRB is comprised of five members
that the President appoints and the Senate confirms.45 The
members serve five-year terms, with one member’s term expiring
every year.46 Currently, three Democrats, including the
presidentially designated Chairman, and two Republicans, serve on
the NLRB.47 In addition to serving as the final decisionmaker in
unfair labor practice disputes brought under the NLRA, the Board
delegates its powers to Regional Directors48 and its Division of
Judges, or administrative law judges (“ALJs”),49 who play an
integral role throughout NLRA proceedings. Similar to traditional
trial judges, ALJs preside over hearings and release opinions on
the merits of complaints issued by Regional Directors.50 If a
complainant is unsatisfied with an ALJ’s decision, he or she may
appeal to the NLRB, which serves as “a specialized court of
appeal.”51
Section 10(c) of the NLRA authorizes the Board to order
employers who engage in unfair labor practices to cease and desist
from such practices and to take affirmative action to reinstate
employees with or without back pay.52 Back pay under the NLRA
44

The Board, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/board (last visited
Oct. 5, 2015).
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Members of the NLRB Since 1935, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/who-weare/board/members-nlrb-1935 (last visited Oct. 5, 2015).
48
The NLRB has 26 “regions” throughout the United States, each headed
by a Regional Director. Regional Offices, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/who-weare/regional-offices (last visited Oct. 5, 2015). When filing a complaint that
alleges unfair labor practices against an employer, the Regional Director is the
authority that decides whether or not formal action should be taken. The NLRB
Process, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/resources/nlrb-process (last visited Oct. 5,
2015).
49
See PATRICK CIHON & JAMES CASTAGNERA, EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR
LAW 365 (8th ed. 2014). The appointment and tenure of ALJs are regulated by 5
U.S.C. § 3105. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (2012).
50
CIHON & CASTAGNERA, supra note 49.
51
Id.
52
29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (2012). For the purpose of this Note, the phrase “back
pay” refers to post-termination back pay in the NLRA context. The phrase
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refers to post-termination back pay, and its purpose is to make
employees whole for any loss in pay that resulted from the
employer’s unlawful conduct.53 According to the Supreme Court,
section 10(a) grants the NLRB broad discretion to choose an
appropriate remedy with limited judicial interference.54 The NLRA
allows the NLRB to devise a remedy that will best “effectuate the
policies of the Act,” with limited judicial review.55 Despite such
apparent authority, however, the NLRB’s broad discretion is
actually quite limited.
Comparing the NLRB’s authority and available remedies to the
Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”),56 another federal statute that
regulates employers and the rights of employees, reveals some of
the NLRA’s limitations. Although the FLSA principally governs
employee wages and hours, it also forces certain employers to
adhere to a national set of labor standards in order to protect
employees’ rights.57 Specifically, the FLSA ensures that
employees work and receive compensation in accordance with the
wage and hour standards outlined in the statute.58 The FLSA
mandates remedies through a statutory formula from which the
“retroactive back pay” refers to another type of back pay, such as that covered
under the FLSA.
53
Robert S. Fuchs & Henry M. Kelleher, The Back-Pay Remedy of the
National Labor Relations Board, 9 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 829, 830
(1968).
54
Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 898 (1984); see also Phelps
Dodge v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941) (“Congress could not catalogue all
the devices and stratagems for circumventing the policies of the Act. Nor could
it define the whole gamut of remedies to effectuate these policies in an infinite
variety of specific situations. Congress met these difficulties by leaving the
adaptation of means to end to the empiric process of administration.”).
55
29 U.S.C. § 160(c).
56
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012).
57
29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (noting that industries in the United States have
“labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of
living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers” and
declaring it the policy of the FLSA to “correct and as rapidly as practicable to
eliminate [those] conditions”).
58
See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (setting out the minimum wage rates that
employers must pay); 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) (requiring an employer to pay
overtime compensation to an employee working over forty hours per week).
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adjudicator cannot depart.59 When an employee brings a
meritorious claim, the FLSA holds employers liable “to the
employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid
minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation . . . and in
an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.”60 The NLRA,
comparatively, does not allow for liquidated damages, which serve
the same deterring purpose of punitive damages, and instead
restricts the Board to issuing cease and desist orders and orders of
reinstatement and back pay.61
After seventy years, the rights that the NLRA was designed to
protect have been universally recognized as essential human
rights.62 Despite a clear recognition of the importance of these
rights, the NLRA’s ability to protect vulnerable populations, such
as unauthorized immigrant workers, has diminished.63 One
possible reason for this failure is the stagnant nature of the law in a
world that has substantially outgrown its parameters.64 While the
Act’s language has “remained virtually untouched” for
generations, the United States has changed dramatically.65 A more
diversified labor force, new models of workplace organization, and
the emergence of laws focusing on employment terms and
59

29 U.S.C. § 216(b).
Lamonica v. Safe Hurricane Shutters, Inc., 711 F.3d 1299, 1307 (11th
Cir. 2013) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)).
61
29 U.S.C. § 160(c).
62
Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 1527, 1528 (2002) (“The right of employees to associate,
communicate about shared concerns, form organizations for mutual aid, and
peacefully seek shared objectives has achieved the status of an international
human right.”); see also, e.g., Richard Kahlenberg & Moshe Z. Marvit, What
Would MLK Do: How to Make Labor Organizing a Civil Right, SLATE (Apr. 3,
2012, 4:30 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence
/2012/04/on_the_anniversary_martin_luther_king_jr_s_death_a_call_to_make_j
oining_a_union_a_civil_right_.html.
63
See BERNHARDT, supra note 28, at 11 (listing frequent violations of labor
laws, including discrimination based on immigration status and retaliation by
threatening to call immigration); Estlund, supra note 62, at 1603–06 (discussing
an example of NLRA’s ineffectiveness in enforcing some of its provisions and
general workplace rights).
64
Estlund, supra note 62, at 1535–37.
65
Id. at 1535–36.
60
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individual rights differentiate the working conditions in America
today from the conditions that existed when Congress last
amended the NLRA in 1959.66
C. Section 1324a of the Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986
The other body of law that is necessarily involved in NLRA
claims brought by unauthorized immigrants is the Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 (“IRCA”).67 Section 1324a of the
IRCA sanctions and criminalizes the hiring of unauthorized
immigrants.68 This section specifically targets any employer who
knowingly hires an unauthorized immigrant or, alternatively, hires
a person without complying with statutory employment
verification requirements.69 The employment verification provision
requires an employer to review an applicant’s documentation and
“attest, under penalty of perjury” that such documentation
indicates the applicant’s identity and authorization to work in the
United States.70 The statute also requires the applicant to attest to
the truthfulness and accuracy of the required documents, making it
unlawful for him or her to present fraudulent papers to obtain
employment.71 However, the statute does not make it unlawful for
unauthorized immigrants to search for employment.72
The main objective of this section of the IRCA is to reduce the
number of unauthorized immigrants settling in the United States by
decreasing access to employment opportunities.73 This is based on
66

Id.
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 99 Pub. L. No. 99-603,
100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
68
8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2012).
69
Id.
70
Id. For a more detailed overview of the inspection process used to
enforce the employment verification provision, see Form I-9 Inspection
Overview, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (June 26, 2013),
https://www.ice.gov/factsheets/i9-inspection.
71
8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(2).
72
8 U.S.C. § 1324a.
73
H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. 1, at 45–46 (1986), as reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649.
67
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the long-held proposition that unauthorized immigrants are drawn
to the United States for employment purposes.74 By imposing
sanctions upon employers who fail to verify that an employee is
legally authorized to work, Congress aimed to deter employers
from hiring unauthorized immigrants and thereby decrease the
incentive for unauthorized immigrants to come to the United States
in search of work.75 However, rather than deterring employers
from hiring unauthorized immigrants, some argue that the
provisions incentivize employers to implement undesirable
strategies to curtail the sanctions imposed by the statute.76
D. The Hoffman Plastic Compounds Dilemma and its
Progeny
Prior to its controversial decision in Hoffman Plastic
Compounds v. NLRB,77 the Supreme Court had already established
that unauthorized immigrants were “employees” protected by the
NLRA, as that designation was consistent with the Act’s “purpose
of encouraging and protecting the collective bargaining process.”78
The Court had not identified, however, the remedies available to
unauthorized immigrants without interfering with the IRCA’s
objectives of discouraging illegal immigration through
employment-related sanctions.79 In Hoffman Plastic Compounds,
74

Id. at 46 (“Employment is the magnet that attracts aliens here illegally or,
in the case of nonimmigrants, leads them to accept employment in violation of
their status.”). While it is clear that employment opportunities create a strong
incentive for people to immigrate to the United States, it is also important to
recognize that other motivating factors exist, such as family reunification and
life-threatening country conditions. See, e.g., Why Are So Many Children Trying
to Cross the US Border?, BBC NEWS (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/
news/world-us-canada-28203923 (attributing the recent surge of unaccompanied
alien children to a spike of gang and drug related violence).
75
See H.R. REP. NO. 99-682.
76
See BERNHARDT, supra note 28, at 35 (“IRCA created incentives for
employers to use cash payment, subcontractors, employee status
misclassification and other strategies in order to escape liability for hiring
undocumented workers.”).
77
Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002).
78
Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892 (1984).
79
See H.R. REP. NO. 99-682.
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the Court addressed this uncertainty in considering whether the
NLRB could award post-termination back pay to an immigrant
who had never been legally permitted to work in the United
States.80 The case arose when several employees of Hoffman
Plastic Compounds, Inc. (“Hoffman”) engaged in union organizing
activities and were subsequently terminated.81 The NLRB found
that Hoffman had unlawfully discharged four of its employees,
including Jose Castro, in retaliation for their protected activities.82
The Board ordered that Hoffman offer reinstatement and back pay
to the four affected employees.83
During the compliance proceedings, the Board found that
Castro had submitted fraudulent documents to Hoffman, which
superficially appeared to verify his employment authorization.84
However, Castro had never received legal admission or work
authorization in the United States.85 The Board reversed the
Administrative Law Judge’s (“ALJ”) decision that the IRCA
precluded the issuing of back pay to Castro, and, after several
appeals, the Supreme Court ultimately granted certiorari to resolve
the issue.86 The Supreme Court concluded that the Board could not
award back pay to Castro on the ground that such an order would
“unduly trench upon explicit statutory prohibitions critical to
federal immigration policy.”87 The Court, effectively prioritizing
the goals of federal immigration policy over those of federal labor
policy, explained that the IRCA made it impossible for
unauthorized immigrants to gain lawful employment without either
the employer or the employee violating federal law.88
In limiting the Board’s remedial discretion, the Court
attempted to downplay the colossal impact of barring back pay as a
remedy by stating that there were other remedies available to the
Board that would just as effectively fulfill the purposes of the
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., 535 U.S. at 143.
Id. at 140.
Id.
Id. at 140–41.
Id. at 141.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 151.
Id. at 148.
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NLRA.89 These remedial alternatives, famously denounced by
Justice Breyer in his dissenting opinion,90 included the orders for
Hoffman to cease and desist its unfair labor practices and to post a
notice to employees explaining their rights under the NLRA and
how Hoffman had previously violated them.91 The Court explained
that these remedies, coupled with the threat of contempt
proceedings if Hoffman failed to comply, were sufficiently
effective in promoting the policies of the NLRA.92 Perhaps
anticipating the ramifications of its decision, the Court called on
Congress to address any “perceived deficiency in the NLRA’s
existing remedial arsenal” rather than leaving it to the courts to
resolve.93
Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsberg, and
Souter, emphatically rejected the Court’s conclusion and argued
that the Board’s ability to award back pay was critical to
compensating victims and, more importantly, deterring employers
from engaging in unlawful labor practices.94 By removing back
pay from its “remedial arsenal,” the Court restricted the Board to
ordering remedies that would impose only “future-oriented
obligations” upon employers engaged in illegal labor practices.95
In 2013, the Second Circuit extended the application of the
Hoffman Plastic Compounds rule to a larger class of employees in
Palma v. NLRB, where the court clarified that any unauthorized
immigrant, regardless of whether he or she had obtained
employment through fraud or misrepresentation, could not recover
back pay under the NLRA.96 The court rejected the ALJ’s
conclusion that the Hoffman Plastic Compounds decision turned
upon the fact that the employee in that case, as an unauthorized
immigrant, had violated the IRCA by presenting fraudulent
documents to an unknowing employer in order to obtain
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

See id. at 152.
Id. at 153 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 152 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. (quoting Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 904 (1984)).
Id. at 153–54 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 154.
Palma v. NLRB, 723 F.3d 176, 184 (2d Cir. 2013).
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employment.97 In Palma, the Second Circuit found that the
employer had violated the IRCA by knowingly hiring an
unauthorized immigrant, and there was no employee fraud
involved.98 However, the court agreed with the Board that
regardless of whether it is the employer or employee who violates
the IRCA, “the result is an unlawful employment relationship.”99
The court noted that Congress’s decision not to explicitly sanction
or criminalize unauthorized immigrants for merely working
without legal status does not mean that Congress intended to
“allow the Board to encourage undocumented workers by
awarding them backpay.”100 The court reiterated Hoffman Plastic
Compounds’ reasoning in stating that it would cut against
Congressional immigration policy to award back pay to an
employee who was never legally entitled to work.101 The court
further relied on Hoffman Plastic Compounds in concluding that,
because the back pay award sought by petitioners stemmed from
such an unlawful employment relationship, allowing for such
damages could potentially excuse prior violations and encourage
future violations of the IRCA.102
The “categorical bar”103 imposed by Palma against awarding
back pay to unauthorized immigrants has yet to be challenged in
the courts, but has been repeatedly confined to the NLRA
context.104 Several district courts have declined to extend Palma’s
rule to plaintiffs seeking damages under the FLSA.105 In Colon v.
Major Perry Street Corp., for example, the Southern District of
97
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100
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103
Second Circuit Holds Undocumented Workers Are Categorically Barred
From Backpay Under the National Labor Relations Act, 127 HARV. L. REV.
1236, 1236 (2014).
104
See, e.g., Akin v. Anjon of Greenlawn, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 3d 239
(E.D.N.Y. 2014); Colon v. Major Perry St. Corp., 987 F. Supp. 2d 451
(S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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See Akin, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 240–41 (listing cases); Colon, 987 F. Supp.
2d at 456–57 (listing cases).
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New York outlined the historical, statutory, and policy differences
between the two statutes to avoid imposing Palma’s categorical
bar in the FLSA context.106 The court provided an overview of the
cases preceding the present interpretation of the NLRA and
concluded that Palma had not changed the well-settled consensus
that unauthorized immigrants are still entitled to back pay under
the FLSA.107 The court then distinguished the remedies available
under the FLSA from those available under the NLRA.108 The
court articulated that the NLRB had particularly broad discretion in
devising an appropriate remedy for violators of the Act, while the
FLSA limited courts to statutorily mandated damages that were not
affected by “shifting immigration polic[ies].”109 Additionally, the
court reasoned that, in accordance with Hoffman Plastic
Compounds, the NLRA provides “many alternative remedies” to
supplement or replace back pay, while the FLSA has few
alternative remedies and relies on retroactive back pay as its
primary form of relief for effectuating the law’s policies.110 The
Colon court further concluded that the NLRA and FLSA regulate
plainly different activities.111 While the NLRA regulates labor
organization by compelling employers to compensate workers
whom they have punished for exercising their labor rights, the
FLSA compels employers to pay their employees for work
performed.112
The Southern District further concluded that the remedy of
back pay available under the NLRA was not synonymous with the
retroactive back pay available under the FLSA.113 Citing other
district courts’ interpretations of the Hoffman Plastic Compounds
holding, the court noted that it did not preclude awarding
retroactive back pay to employees for work performed.114 Unlike
awarding post-termination back pay, an order compelling an
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114

Colon, 987 F. Supp. 2d at 451, 454–64.
Id. at 456–58.
Id. at 458–59.
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Id. at 459–60.
Id. at 460–61.
Id. at 461–62.
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employer to pay an unauthorized immigrant for work performed
does not condone or continue the immigration violation, and
instead ensures that the employer does not “avail[] himself of the
benefit of undocumented workers’ past labor without paying for
it.”115 However, post-termination back pay sought under the NLRA
was only recoverable for employees who were deemed “available
for work” after their wrongful termination, a qualification that the
Supreme Court had previously established was inapplicable to
unauthorized immigrants.116
Finally, the court explained that a “cost-benefit analysis” of
employers’ incentives in an underenforced regime would reveal
that providing back pay to unauthorized immigrants under the
FLSA was more aligned with the policies of the IRCA than
providing back pay under the NLRA.117 The court deemed the cost
of removing back pay as a remedy under the FLSA higher than the
cost for removing back pay under the NLRA because the only
other deterring remedy available under the FLSA was a $1,100
fine for “repeat or willful violat[ors]” of the law.118 The court also
found that the benefit of an employer underpaying its unauthorized
employees and receiving an immediate accrual of cheap labor was
very great, and thus a strong incentive for employers to violate the
IRCA if the FLSA back pay remedy was not a consequence.119 On
the other hand, it was far more “attenuated” that an employer
would seek to hire an unauthorized immigrant based on the fact
that post-termination back pay was not available as a remedy under
the NLRA.120 The court here did not assert that back pay under the
NLRA was not beneficial to promoting national immigration
policy, but simply provided that the FLSA provided a greater
benefit to the promotion of such policies.121
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E. The Labor Rights of an Unauthorized Immigrant Today
and the Administrative Process under the NLRA

Despite the post-Hoffman Plastic Compounds criticism122 and
the lower courts’ refusal to extend the Hoffman Plastic Compounds
rule to cases arising under the FLSA or state labor laws,123 few
cases brought beyond the context of NLRB administrative
proceedings have challenged the legitimacy of the Hoffman Plastic
Compounds holding.
Griselda Barrera exemplifies the challenges presented by the
Hoffman Plastic Compounds ruling. Her story demonstrates how
Hoffman Plastic Compounds and the lack of comprehensive reform
creates a real problem for a particularly vulnerable population.124
Ms. Barrera followed the proper NLRA procedure and filed the
initial charge with the NLRB’s General Counsel, who issued a
complaint about five months later.125 The complaint alleged that
Ms. Barrera’s employer had violated section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA
by “threatening to terminate employees” and actually terminating
Ms. Barrera for “engag[ing] in protected concerted activity.”126
122

See, e.g., Gabriela Robin, Hoffman Plastic Compounds Inc. v. National
Labor Relations Board: A Step Backwards for All Workers in the United States,
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Unauthorized immigrant workers are more vulnerable than native U.S.
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SMITH, WORKERS RIGHTS ON ICE 2 (2013), http://www.nelp.org/content
/uploads/2015/03/Workers-Rights-on-ICE-Retaliation-Report-California.pdf.
The statistics that support these facts probably underestimate the true number of
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workers who fear retaliation from their employers. Id.; see also Paul Harris,
Undocumented Workers’ Grim Reality: Speak Out On Abuse and Risk
Deportation, GUARDIAN (Mar. 28, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/
2013/mar/28/undocumented-migrants-worker-abuse-deportation (reporting the
stories of undocumented workers who spoke out against employer abuses and
faced deportation).
125
Staffing Network Holdings, LLC, 13-CA-105031, 2014 WL 3548163
(N.L.R.B. July 17, 2014), 2014 WL 3548163, modified, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 12
(Feb. 4, 2015), 2015 WL 471428.
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The Board held an evidentiary hearing and decided that the claims
alleged in the complaint were indeed meritorious.127 It found that
Ms. Barrera’s employer had unlawfully threatened to terminate its
employees at two separate times, and that it had unlawfully
terminated Ms. Barrera.128 One of the defenses that Ms. Barrera’s
employer attempted to raise was that Ms. Barrera was not a legally
authorized immigrant and therefore could not receive awards of
reinstatement or back pay.129 In accordance with the policies set
forth by the NLRB after Hoffman Plastic Compounds,130 the Board
explained that it could not consider such a defense until the
compliance proceedings.131 The Board officially ordered that Ms.
Barrera’s employer offer her full reinstatement and back pay,
among the other traditional remedies.132
Despite the Board’s decision in Ms. Barrera’s favor, its order
will not be effectuated until it reaches the compliance proceedings,
at which the respondents will most likely raise the issue of Ms.
Barrera’s immigration status in an attempt to preclude the
enforcement of the Board’s ordered remedies.133 Ms. Barrera’s
case has not yet reached compliance proceedings, but, based on the
current state of the law and the remaining procedural steps in the
127
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Dirs., Officer-in-Charge and Resident Officers, Procedures and Remedies for
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Compounds, Inc. (July 19, 2002), http://apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx
/09031d45800e2379; see also Memorandum from Richard A. Siegel, Assoc.
Gen. Counsel, to All Reg’l Dirs., Officers-in-Charge and Resident Officers,
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NLRB Proceedings 3 (June 7, 2011) [hereinafter OM 11-62],
http://apps.nlrb.gov/link/document.aspx/09031d45818801f9
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proceedings or at the merits stage of unfair labor practice proceedings.”).
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NLRB claim process, there are several assumptions that one can
make about her case’s outcome. In 2011, the NLRB’s Office of the
General Counsel issued a memorandum instructing officers on the
protocol for handling immigration issues arising in the context of
NLRB investigations and proceedings.134 With these policies in
mind, in conjunction with those set forth by the Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”),135 Ms. Barrera’s case may proceed as
follows: if Ms. Barrera’s employer challenges her eligibility to
recover reinstatement and back pay during the compliance
proceedings, it carries the burden of showing the “existence of a
genuine issue” of immigration status.136 Immigration related
questioning is therefore relevant during the compliance
proceedings to decide whether a genuine issue exists.137 If Ms.
Barrera can verify that she was indeed authorized to work in the
United States, her award of back pay will likely stand. If, however,
Ms. Barrera’s employer is able to establish that her immigration
status is a genuine issue, the Board has several options. First, it
may simply order “conditional reinstatement,” which would
require the employer to rehire Ms. Barrera only on the condition
that she present valid employment authorization.138 This option
would only be available to Ms. Barrera if she had not previously
presented such authorization at her initial time of hiring.139
Alternatively, the Board can attempt to defer immigration action or
pursue the certification of visas.140
The NLRB General Counsel has outlined several
circumstances in which Regions should bring a matter to the
134

OM 11-62, supra note 130.
Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, to All Field Office Dirs., Special Agents in Charge, Chief
Counsel, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion Consistent with the Civil
Immigration Enforcement Priorities of the Agency for the Apprehension,
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attention of the Division of Operations Management to consider
whether to pursue one of the above alternative actions, such as
deferred action or certification of visas: 1) where the status of an
individual involved in the case is lost due to concerted activities
that are protected; 2) where the individual’s presence in the
country is important in order for the Act’s purpose to be enforced;
3) where NLRB or immigration processes are being abused by the
employer; and/or 4) where the employer knew or was willfully
ignorant of the employee’s lack of status.141
These circumstances, though not exhaustive, illustrate
situations in which the Board may decide to seek assistance from
the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”),
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), or Customs and
Border Patrol (“CBP”).142 These agencies then may choose to
exercise prosecutorial discretion, a rather broad executive power
that permits any law enforcement agency to decide whether or not
to proceed with enforcing the law against someone.143 In the
immigration context, this power encompasses “[f]ocusing
enforcement resources on particular administrative violations or

141
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conduct; . . . granting deferred action . . . or staying a final removal
order,” and other discretionary enforcement decisions.144
The administrative mechanism of deferred action,145 in addition
to the DHS’s policy of prioritizing parties for whom immigration
enforcement is essential or nonessential,146 indicate progress for
unauthorized immigrants who wish to assert their rights under the
NLRA. Because of the policies that these agencies set forth, an
unauthorized immigrant can file a complaint with the NLRB
without having to initially reveal her immigration status, and
generally avoid the immigration issue until the compliance
proceedings.147 The immediate fear of ICE interference and the

144

Memorandum from Doris Meissner, Comm’r, Immigration &
Nationalization Serv., to Reg’l Dirs., District Dirs., Chief Patrol Agents, Reg’l
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threat of deportation should be minimal, even at the compliance
stage, where employees may still avoid deportation.148
F. Recent Immigration Reform
1. The Senate Bill
In May of 2013, the Senate passed a comprehensive
immigration bill called the Border Security, Economic
Opportunity, and Immigration Modernization Act, or S. 744.149
Section 3101(a)(8)(A)(i) provides that employees cannot be denied
the remedies of state and federal labor protection laws as a
consequence of their immigration status.150 The section still
prohibits reinstatement as a remedy under the NLRA for an
unauthorized worker, but allows for all other remedies.151
Specifically targeting the back pay issue, the bill provides:
[A]ll rights and remedies provided under Federal,
State, or local law relating to workplace rights,
including but not limited to back pay, are available
to an employee despite (i) the employee’s status as
an unauthorized alien during or after the period of
employment; or, (ii) the employer’s or employee’s
failure to comply with the requirements of this
section.152
This provision goes so far as to extend back pay and the full
arsenal of NLRA remedies even to unauthorized workers who have
148
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obtained employment through fraudulent means, as was the case in
Hoffman Plastic Compounds.
While S. 744 drew support from a variety of groups,153 the
House of Representatives has yet to put it to a vote.154 Despite the
further efforts of bipartisan Senators and House Democrats, there
has been little movement in the area of immigration since the
House’s failed attempt to pass a counterpart to S. 744, HR 15.155
House Republicans asserted that a “piecemeal” approach would be
better than a large, comprehensive bill but have failed to act on that
approach as well.156
2. President Obama’s 2014 Executive Action
On November 20, 2014, “President [Obama] announced a
series of executive actions” that expanded the use of deferred
action in immigration.157 Deferred action, though not a means of
permanent immigration relief, allows for an unauthorized
153
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immigrant to gain work authorization and is renewable every two
years.158 The Obama Administration expanded upon its 2012
program, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”),
allowing people who came to the United States as children and met
a particular set of guidelines to affirmatively apply for deferred
action.159 In expanding the program, President Obama increased
the population of individuals eligible to apply to DACA by
opening the program to applicants of any current age, rather than
only those under thirty.160 The administration also extended the
time period for DACA and work authorization from two to three
years before renewal is necessary.161
Highlighting the significance of having familial ties to a U.S.
citizen or legal permanent resident,162 President Obama announced
a new program in November 2014 that would begin accepting
applications in six months for Deferred Action for Parents of
Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (“DAPA”).163 Similar
to DACA, DAPA applicants would have to meet certain criteria to
be eligible for the temporary relief.164 Under DACA, the applicant
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must have arrived in the United States before the age of sixteen,165
demonstrating his or her ties to U.S. education, culture, and society
from a young age. Under DAPA, the applicant must have a child
that is a U.S. citizen or legal permanent resident,166 demonstrating
a familial tie to the United States. Both programs have been met
with challenges, including a court order issued by Judge Andrew S.
Hanen of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas,
and have been at least temporarily stalled.167 Despite the
uncertainty of the programs’ futures, DACA and DAPA exemplify
the prioritization policies of the current administration and provide
stepping stones for policy makers in Congress to make meaningful
changes to immigration legislation.
II. THREE REASONS WHY AN EMPLOYEE-BASED SOLUTION IS
NECESSARY
The NLRA and IRCA share a common purpose of employercentered deterrence. The IRCA aims to deter employers from
hiring unauthorized immigrants168 and the NLRA seeks to deter
employers from exploiting the labor rights of their employees.169
The Obama Administration has emphasized these goals through its
policies and has made impressive strides in penalizing employer-
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violators.170 For example, under the Bush Administration, “ICE
issued only eighteen final orders [against violating employers] in
2008, resulting in $675,000 in fines.”171 Under the Obama
Administration in 2013, however, ICE reported serving over three
thousand notices of worksite inspections and over six hundred final
orders, resulting in nearly $16 million in fines.172 Despite such
increases, the executive’s reach has not extended far enough to
prevent employers from violating federal laws. Indeed, statistics
still indicate that a large number of unauthorized immigrants are
employed in the United States,173 and are more often subject to
unfair and unsafe working conditions imposed by their
employers.174 U.S. labor policy should therefore focus on
incentivizing unauthorized employees to assert their labor rights
under the NLRA for three reasons: 1) more unauthorized
immigrant workers coming forward with NLRA claims would
deter employers from violating both the NLRA and the IRCA; 2)
full protection to all employees regardless of immigration status
would be consistent with the rights promised to all employees
under the NLRA and would comport with our nation’s basic
understanding of human rights; and 3) an employee incentives
model would reward those employees who act consistently with
the labor values of the United States and present themselves as
ideal candidates for citizenship.
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A. Employer Deterrence

In the years since Hoffman Plastic Compounds, various policy
memorandums from the NLRB and the DHS have improved the
landscape for unauthorized immigrants who choose to bring
complaints to the NLRB without threat of immediate
deportation.175 In general, there has been a steady downward trend
of employee-filed charges before the NLRB since fiscal year
2005.176 This may result from fewer employer workplace
violations. There is also the possibility, however, that employees
are simply reluctant to assert their labor rights or that their
complaints are underenforced.177 All workers, both authorized and
unauthorized, should be interested in holding employer-violators
accountable for their illegal and unfair conduct. Applying an
across-the-board remedy like back pay encourages employees to
assert complaints and also forces employer-violators to pay for
their illegal actions—thus deterring any further violations.178
Incentivizing unauthorized employees to bring forward
complaints under the NLRA also achieves the prioritization goals
of immigration policy in that ICE can focus its resources on
employers who have knowingly exploited the rights of its
unauthorized employees.179 Employers who treat their employees
fairly and according to the law, despite their immigration status,
will not be held accountable for IRCA violations through the
NLRB process. While such employers will still be subject to
discipline if discovered through an ICE workplace raid or a
verification process audit, they can avoid ICE by engaging in fair
labor practices with respect to all employees. However, if an
175
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employer repeatedly exploits the rights of unauthorized workers,
federal immigration agencies can benefit from more employeevictims bringing meritorious complaints to the NLRB, and then
working with victims and the NLRB to target the repeat-offenders.
This would further the IRCA’s goals of penalizing employerviolators.180
B. Humanitarian Values
The NLRA promotes an unimpaired flow of commerce by
eliminating sources of “industrial strife,” encouraging alternative
means of labor disputes, and ensuring “equality of bargaining
power among employers and employees.”181 While the statute also
mentions that the problem of unequal bargaining power results
from the denial of employees to possess freedom of association
and liberty, there is no stated motive to protect human or
fundamental rights of workers in the text of the statute.182
However, the international community has generally recognized
labor rights as fundamental human rights,183 and the U.S. executive
branch regularly exercises its authority for humanitarian purposes
in both the immigration and labor context through prosecutorial
discretion.184
It would be contrary to American principles of equality and
fairness to deprive some workers of the full protection of the
NLRA based on their immigration status. Indeed, unauthorized
immigrants are still members of U.S. society “who make valuable
contributions to not only the economy . . . but also to the cultural
fabric” of our country.185 The overlap of immigration law and
180
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labor law should not only produce negative or inconsistent results,
as it has in the wake of Hoffman Plastic Compounds. Instead, the
United States would benefit from using the same humanitarian
policy behind prosecutorial discretion to extend equal rights to all
of its workers, regardless of their immigration status, who have
been subjected to unfair labor practices.
C. Upholding American Labor Values and Embracing
Citizen-Like Qualities of Unauthorized Immigrants
Unauthorized immigrants need to receive full protection under
the NLRA in order to promote the distinct rights that the statute
seeks to protect. Unlike the FLSA, where employees may be
compensated for unpaid wages or overtime for their individual
work performed,186 the NLRA encourages union activity and
collective bargaining to achieve fair working conditions for all
workers.187 Under the FLSA, an employee may realize that he has
been individually wronged by his employer, sue for compensation,
and incidentally deter his employer from wronging other
employees. Conversely, an employee who has been retaliated
against by her employer for her protected concerted activity files a
complaint under the NLRA primarily to enjoin her employer from
continuing to engage in harmful labor practices. The recovery of
back pay is only incidental. The employee who asserts a complaint
under the NLRA, regardless of immigration status, does not come
forward for the wholly self-interested reason of obtaining damages,
but rather comes forward to combat the unfair labor practices that
affect all employees in similar positions. Indeed, every U.S.
employee, authorized or unauthorized, stands to benefit from his
coworker standing up to an unlawful employer.
The unauthorized worker who is motivated by factors other
than back pay presents characteristics and values that deserve
special attention. While the remedy of back pay undoubtedly
Immigration Law and Labor Law, 35 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 217, 240
(2014).
186
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increases the incentive for employees to assert when they have
been retaliated against for protected activity, the underlying motive
is solidarity.188 Stephen Lee, author of Screening for Solidarity,
published in the University of Chicago Law Review, recognizes
this unique solidarity principle behind the NLRA.189 Lee has
suggested that unauthorized immigrants who assert their labor
rights in solidarity with authorized U.S. workers demonstrate a
desirable quality that merits immigration benefits.190 Lee seems to
limit this model to unauthorized immigrants who have formed
social and economic bonds with their authorized coworkers
through “cross-status solidarity.”191 However, even unauthorized
immigrants who assert labor complaints under the NLRA in
solidarity with other unauthorized immigrants demonstrate
qualities that merit priority protection from removal. Unauthorized
immigrants who come forward in solidarity with other
unauthorized workers display qualities such as courage, a sense of
moral duty, and a commitment to fairness in the workplace that
deserve at least some temporary immigration relief.
III. TWO APPROACHES TO INCENTIVIZING UNAUTHORIZED
IMMIGRANTS TO ASSERT THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE NLRA
To achieve these three goals, Congress must provide a remedy
attractive enough to incentivize unauthorized employees to come
forward with their complaints and endure the long NLRB process.
If not for the rules set forth by Hoffman Plastic Compounds and its
successors, the remedy of back pay existing under the NLRA could
serve to entice unauthorized employees to come forward. Many
have argued, however, that back pay’s effectiveness as a labor
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regulating remedy has diminished over the years.192 For
unauthorized workers who may be vulnerable to employer threats,
unaware of their labor rights, or fearful of deportation, back pay
alone may not sufficiently incentivize them to exercise their labor
rights. Therefore, Congress and the President must work together
to create a multifaceted incentive for unauthorized workers that
encourages them to stand up against employer-violators and enjoy
the full protection of the NLRA.
A. Congressional Action
Congressional inefficiency—exemplified in the failure of
Senate Bill S. 744—makes the prospect of legislative action seem
unlikely. While S. 744 would have been instrumental in
incentivizing unauthorized immigrants to assert their labor rights
under the NLRA, a “piecemeal” approach, as asserted by some
politicians, may be necessary. The breadth and comprehensiveness
of S. 744, which some may perceive as a necessary strength in
order to address many outstanding problems with immigration law,
may also be perceived as overbroad and unfocused. Republicans
and Democrats should work together to amend the IRCA to
include a provision similar to that written in S. 744193 that clarifies
that back pay is an available remedy to all employees despite
irregular immigration status. By reestablishing back pay as a
remedy available to all workers, unauthorized immigrants would
be placed on an even playing field. This would further incentivize
them to bring their NLRA complaints forward.
B. Executive Action
Providing an opportunity for those who assert their labor rights
to affirmatively seek deferred action would also incentivize
unauthorized immigrants to come forward with NLRA complaints.
Granting deferred action to unauthorized immigrants at the
192
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compliance stage is something that the General Counsel has the
authority to explore with immigration agencies in certain
circumstances.194
Without having some degree of certainty that she will be safe
from deportation by the end of the NLRB complaint process,
however, an unauthorized immigrant is unlikely to assert her
complaint.195 First, even a successful complaint may only result in
a cease and desist order and a minimal fine.196 This may only be
beneficial if the undocumented worker wishes to protect her
former colleagues, or if she places great value on the notion of
workplace justice. Second, there is no guarantee that she will be
granted deferred action, as the immigration status question is only
addressed at the final stage in NLRB proceedings, during which
time the decision regarding a grant of deferred action is left up to
the discretion of the Board. With the process currently in place, an
unauthorized immigrant fired in response to participating in
protected concerted activity, would likely move on to find another
job. Since immigrants (both authorized and unauthorized) are more
likely to be found working in industries that have poor working
conditions,197 the cycle of working for abusive employers without
an incentive to assert one’s labor rights could continue indefinitely.
This reality frustrates the Congressional purposes that Hoffman
Plastic Compounds and its progeny have purported to promote in
stripping back pay from the NLRB’s “remedial arsenal.”198
Similar to DACA and DAPA, the current administration should
develop a process by which an unauthorized immigrant, upon
filing a charge under the NLRA, may also apply for deferred
action. This process would provide a means of affirmative,
temporary relief, without the uncertainty of prosecutorial discretion
194
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at the compliance stage of NLRB proceedings. To be eligible for
such relief, an unauthorized immigrant should meet most of the
general guidelines set out by DACA and DAPA, such as the
absence of past felony convictions and not being considered an
enforcement priority for removal.199 Instead of meeting the DACA
or DAPA criteria, the proposed requirement would be the
concurrent filing of a complaint against an employer under the
NLRA. The establishment of this standard would demonstrate that
the applicant has significant ties to his or her fellow workers and to
American labor values and thus deserves special consideration as
an individual contributing to the betterment of the American
workplace. Such a vehicle would be consistent with the prioritizing
principles laid out in the DHS’s most recent memorandum,200 but
would add another layer to American immigration enforcement.
CONCLUSION
For over ten years, the government has failed to address the
uncertainty and injustice created by Hoffman Plastic Compounds
and has yet to create a solution that reconciles federal immigration
law with federal labor law. Incentivizing unauthorized immigrants
to assert their labor rights under the NLRA is necessary to deter
employer-violators from violating federal labor laws, to provide
full protection to all workers from human rights abuse, and to
reward unauthorized workers for their citizen-like qualities and
demonstrated commitment to fairness and justice for all in the
American labor force. The ideal incentive to entice unauthorized
immigrant victims of NLRA violations would include both
legislative and executive action. A legislative approach to
extending the back pay remedy to unauthorized immigrants would
provide the NLRB with a consistently effective enforcement
mechanism against employer-violators and fulfill its promise of
199
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labor rights protection to all employees, regardless of immigration
status. Providing back pay to individuals who have been the
objects of employer retaliation would incentivize those individuals
to take action against their employers in order to (1) deter unfair
and illegal employer behavior that effectively impacts all
employees and (2) receive compensation for wages lost as a result
of an employer’s violation. An executive action creating a process
in which deferred action could be granted to unauthorized
immigrant complainants in the first stages of the NLRB process
would further incentivize unauthorized immigrants to come
forward and further the purposes of the NLRA. While a bipartisan,
dual-branched effort may seem like an impossible ideal in the
current political climate, it is an ideal that the government should
strive for in order to ensure the vitality of American labor values
and equal protection for all workers.

